Category: Blog

With Pakistan’s general elections looming overhead, it’s high time for political parties to publish their manifestos and inform the population of their economic objectives, and policy intentions for if and when, they win the elections. A manifesto also demonstrates the party’s roadmap for achieving the principles, values, and ideology that it prioritises. Thus, it is a key tool for the population to make informed, democratic decisions.

Pakistan’s political parties generally do not provide a detailed overview of the feasibility, timeline and implementation process of the policy promises that they make in their manifestos. In fact, less than 20% of Pakistan’s key economic and policy issues have been addressed in the political manifestos of the top three parties, and they usually lack financially probable, discussion-based recommendations, or effective consultations, during their formulation process. For example, Pakistan People’s Party has announced its 10-point manifesto for the 2023 elections, in which it promises free healthcare services for all citizens, construction of three million houses for the homeless, and green energy parks in every district, amongst other things. However, this manifesto does not offer any practical plans to achieve these ambitious goals, or consider Pakistan’s precarious financial circumstances as the country’s external debt reached $124.3 billion in June 2023.

As witnessed in the past elections, manifestos are often disregarded soon after the elections take place, as majority of the parties view manifestos as mere formalities that most of the voting population will not pay attention to – which makes them inconsequential and neglecting execution. Nevertheless, it is pertinent that civilians are made aware of all the published political manifestos so that they can make informed decisions that reflect their needs from the upcoming government. Moreover, a manifesto serves as a record of a party’s promises to the public – and an opportunity to hold the party accountable for delivering on the promises which it has made.

Therefore, political manifestos should include quantitative, evidence-based policy targets that adhere to a regulatory framework and a set timeline. They must offer viable solutions for addressing Pakistan’s most pressing challenges, which range from economic development, climate change, human rights and security, and democratic civilian empowerment.

Thus, this blog highlights some of the most pertinent issues impacting Pakistan today, which require immediate focus in political manifestos.

Economic Policy and Human Development:

Pakistan’s rising foreign debt is a subject of growing concern, and in order to ensure sustainable economic growth, the state must prioritise long-term strategic economic policy, over short-term relief.

The country has long-crossed the 58% mark for its debt-to-GDP ratio, which had been set by the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act. SBP reported that the country’s total debt and liabilities reach up to 91.1% of the GDP in FY2023. This paints a grim picture for the country’s financial future if Pakistan does not break out of its debt trap and empower the domestic economy to reform the local business sector and improve both efficiency and productivity.

Pakistan can attract foreign business inflows if the country provides a stable and conducive business environment that adheres to an established regulatory framework. By reforming its standard of operations for business processes, the country can foster market competition and job growth. Moreover, Pakistan must also resolve the constraints that impact private sector activity, such as protectionist trade policies, lack of investment, surging inflation and corruption. Possible interventions that can be adopted but political parties have yet to focus on include incentivizing exports, implementation of market-friendly business regulations, and investment into small and medium-sized businesses.

In FY22, Pakistan was spending only 1.7% and 1.4% of its GDP on education and health respectively. This is one of the lowest public spending in these sectors, within South Asia. Thus, political parties need to emphasize how the state can utilise its 242 million population by investing in its human capital, via human development programmes, facilitating quality-improvement of its education sector, and enhancing research and development. Moreover, Pakistan’s female labour force participation rate stands at a mere 21%, which indicates that the country is losing out the economic productivity of women’s participation in the workforce. Thus, the country must mobilise development initiatives to enhance women’s access to education, skill development and thus, improve their role in the economy.

The Role of 18^th Amendment:

In recent years, devolution has stalled and there is a lack of accountability in performance or resource allocation at both provincial and federal levels, which has hindered good governance and fiscal responsibility and effective administration by the state. Thus, it is essential for political parties to clarify their stance on the future of the 18^th Amendment since its present-day set-up does not reflect its original promises of provincial autonomy.

A common criticism against the 18^th Amendment’s enactment is over the lack of efficient coordination in provincial service delivery and administration. This has also resulted in a fragmented tax base and hindered tax policy and collection. Pakistan’s poor ranking in human development (161^st out of 192), education (37% of school-age children are out of schools), and gender disparity (ranking 142^nd out of 146 countries), all showcase the country’s inability to address key issues of the population.

These issues can be resolved by building the capacity of the provincial governments to raise their own resources, and mandate greater transparency in all policy and monetary processes. Local governments need to be empowered by ensuring that devolution cascades down to the district or “tehsil” level. Instead of simply assigning the devolved functions to the relevant ministries on paper, the allotment should be accompanied by financial, legislative, and administrative autonomy. Moreover, the policymaking process should be monitored at every stage to ensure effective governance.

Thus, political parties should outline how they will ensure that basic service delivery will be decentralised to the grass roots level, in their manifestos. As well as how they plan to combat regional inequalities and hold local government accountable to the public’s interests.

Climate Change Crisis:

There is no doubt of Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate change, as the country faces acute water shortage, extremely hazardous levels of air pollution, high temperatures and devastating floods. Increased urbanisation, lack of urban planning, and management all contribute to exacerbate Pakistan’s climate change vulnerability, as there is an absence of climate-resilience settlement planning or sustainable development initiatives. This had a catastrophic impact during the 2022 floods, in which almost 8 million people were displaced from their homes.

Thus, it is essential for political parties to recognise the severe risk of Pakistan’s climate change crisis and propose measures to mitigate these threats. These policy measures should be constructed on science-based regulations, following the best global, sustainable practices. Effective climate change mitigation requires disrupting the existing socioeconomic structure of the country, to introduce financial, institutional, social, and regulatory reforms that will alleviate the climate crisis. Moreover, climate change inequalities must be addressed through social and economic packages to ease the disproportionate impact of climate change on the vulnerable communities such as women, marginalised groups and the lower-income population. There must also be a transparent allocation of the necessary funds and measurable targets set in place to assess the policy impact on the environment.

In conclusion, political manifestos should clearly illustrate why and how the specific policy targets were selected, which institutions were involved in raising these issues, how the policy will be enacted, what are the costs, potential barriers, and solutions. These should be presented to the public so that they make educated voting decisions for Pakistan’s future.

 

This blog is based on a seminar organised by CPPG, CDPR, and IGC on “Elections 2024: Identifying Key Policy Issues.”

Ayesha Zaman is a Research Associate at the Consortium for Development Policy Research.

This blog is based on a recent IGC funded study and draws on findings from the working paper—titled “Forecasts: Consumption, Production, and Behavioral Responses”— available here. 

Air pollution is a serious problem

South Asia perennially experiences the worst air quality in the world, posing a significant risk to human health. In Lahore—Pakistan’s second most populous city and the capital of Punjab province—reducing particulate matter (PM2.5) levels to the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) standards would lead an average resident to gain 7.5 life years. Beyond mortality and morbidity, both long-term and short-term exposure to hazardous air impairs brain development and cognitive ability, affecting school outcomes, labor productivity, and decision-making in general.

Figure 1 depicts Lahore’s daily PM2.5 levels in micrograms per cubic meter (μg/m³) from February – August 2023 by three different sources along with the local Environmental Protection Department’s (EPD’s) daily PM2.5 mandated standard and the WHO’s daily PM2.5 recommended safe standard. The trends reveal that Lahore’s air pollution levels exceeded the mandated and recommended safe standards almost throughout the six-month period—on an overwhelming majority of days, pollution levels remained considerably higher than the standards.

Though improving air quality in cities like Lahore is a major challenge—we know what the broader policy response should look like, but policymakers lack resolve—citizens can’t afford to wait for policymakers to get their act together. When citizens end up constantly facing hazardous air, they must adapt to protect themselves from air pollution’s myriad harmful effects.

Figure 1: Daily PM2.5 levels

Note: This figure shows Lahore’s daily PM2.5 levels (in μg/m3) from Feb – Aug 2023 by three different sources—1) United States Consulate, Lahore (US Consulate [blue trend line]); 2) Pakistan Air Quality Initiative (PAQI [orange trend line]); and 3) Environment Protection Department Punjab (EPD [green trend line]). The red horizontal line represents the EPD’s daily PM2.5 mandated standard while the black horizontal line represents the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) daily PM2.5 recommended safe standard.

Air pollution forecasts

Air pollution forecasts comprise an important form of information that allow citizens to avoid hazardous air and adapt to air pollution. Economic theory predicts that forecasts in general improve welfare. For example, if you accurately forecast rain tomorrow, you may carry an umbrella to prevent yourself from getting drenched. Or if you forecast an income shock next month, you may adjust your current consumption to buffer the predicted shock. Similarly, if citizens can forecast high pollution, they may act to avoid poor air quality.

But developing-city residents face a challenging information landscape to accurately forecast air pollution. In Lahore, some sources (public and private) now provide retrospective and real-time air quality information, but such efforts remain incomplete in space and time, and information quality is uncertain. Retrospective and real-time readings aren’t readily available to residents—especially the majority who don’t speak English—while air pollution forecasts are entirely absent.

Average levels of human capital (education, training, skills, etc.) also hamper developing-city residents’ ability to accurately forecast. An average Lahori receives under seven years of education while an average Pakistani receives under five years—a year lower than India, and roughly comparable to Uganda, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Residents across the developing world face similar skill constraints and may confront the same behavioral biases that generate forecasting errors even in highly educated populations.

What we ask and how we answer our questions

We study how developing-world urbanites solve air pollution forecasting problems in the presence of limited information and human capital. We concern ourselves with the following broad questions. 1) Do developing-city residents value air pollution forecasts? 2) Can we improve their forecasting ability? 3) How do forecasts influence their behavior, especially air pollution avoidance? The answers to these questions shed light on human decision making and inform benefit-cost analyses of policies concerning air pollution monitoring and abatement.

To address our research questions, we implemented a randomized controlled trial with roughly 1,000 residents of a lower-middle-income neighborhood in Lahore, Pakistan. Our experiment included two treatments: 1) day-ahead air pollution forecasts delivered by text message (SMS) for eight months; and 2) general in-person training designed to improve forecasting performance. During a baseline survey before deploying our treatment, every respondent received a pamphlet explaining (in basic Urdu) fine particulate matter (PM2.5), how its measured, and its health effects.

We designed a model to forecast day-ahead PM2.5 air pollution, combining data from the Lahore US Consulate’s pollution monitor and two satellite sources (MeteoBlue and SPRINTARS). We delivered the PM2.5 forecasts through SMS at 8 p.m. every evening for eight months to a random subset of our respondents.

We also implemented a one-hour training in forecasting skills based on the principles of Philip Tetlock and Daniel Kahneman with another random subset of our respondents. Broadly, the training aimed to reduce behavioral and psychological mistakes that decrease the accuracy of subjects’ forecasts.

Some of our respondents received both the forecasts and the training. Respondents in the control group received neither treatment. We compare the average outcomes of respondents in our treatment groups with those in the control group. Figure 2 depicts the experimental groups.

Figure 2: Experimental Groups

They focused on the following outcomes: 1) willingness to pay for air pollution forecasts; 2) error in forecasting air pollution; 3) willingness to pay for particulate filtering (N95) masks; and 4) time use (time spent outdoors) in response to air quality. To elicit truthful responses, we incentivized the first three outcomes. The experiment ran April 2019 – February 2020, concluding just before Covid-19 broke out in Pakistan.

What do we find?

First, developing-city residents value air pollution information. Respondents who received our one-day-ahead air pollution forecasts were willing to pay an average of 93 PKR (in terms of PKR’s value in January 2020) to continue receiving forecasts for 90 days (Figure 3). On a monthly basis, this equals roughly 60 percent of the cost of 4G mobile internet access or 20 percent of an unskilled laborer’s one-day earnings. Thus, scaling the service across the city—with close to 14 million residents—will lead to large public benefits relative to the costs of providing the service.

Figure 3: Willingness to pay (WTP) for air pollution forecasts

Note: This figure shows the willingness to pay (WTP) in Pakistani Rupees (PKR) to continue receiving air pollution forecasts for another 90 days for respondents who received our daily day-ahead forecasts. The vertical long-dashed line marks the average WTP at 93.22 PKR, while the vertical short-dashed line marks the median WTP at 100 PKR. We elicited the WTP using an incentivized mechanism (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak) with a maximum bid of 200 PKR.

 

Second, we can improve residents’ pollution forecasting ability. Both forecast provision and in-person training improved respondents’ pollution forecasts. Both treatments reduced respondents’ error in forecasts of fine particulates (PM2.5) by roughly 5 micrograms per cubic meter (μg/m³)—which equals approximately 20 percent of the World Health Organization’s corresponding maximum safe 24-hour standard. Given that four to six months elapsed between when we trained our respondents and elicited outcomes, the notable error reduction shows that our training durably increased human capital.

Third, we can increase residents’ demand for pollution avoidance goods. Forecast provision increased willingness to pay for particulate filtering (N95) masks by roughly five percent of the retail price (Figure 4). While forecast training also increased the willingness to pay for particulate filtering masks by a similar amount, our estimated effect is statistically imprecise. Pooling all respondents, the average willingness to pay for N95 masks was roughly 70 percent of the retail price.

Figure 4: Demand curves for particulate filtering (N95) masks

Note: This figure shows the demand for particulate filtering (N95) masks across the control and treatment arms. We elicited willingness to pay (WTP) using an incentivized mechanism (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak), in which all subjects bid on an N95 mask with a retail price of 135 PKR. We capped the maximum bid at 200 PKR. We’ve expressed quantity demanded as the share of subjects purchasing—that is, the share with WTP greater than or equal to a given price.

 

Fourth, we can enable residents to align their time use with the level of air pollution. Respondents who received our pollution forecasts increased outdoor time by 16 percent on relatively less polluted days and reduced outdoor time by 3 percent on more polluted days. These results were more pronounced for individuals who reported caring about air quality (during our pre-treatment baseline survey) and for children.

Policy takeaways

We present evidence of meaningful willingness to pay for air pollution forecasts among developing-country urbanites, which suggests that the scarcity of environmental information in many developing countries does not stem from a lack of demand. While capital and operating costs for reference-quality air pollution monitors are considerable—the equipment for a single site typically costs more than

$20,000—the level of demand we estimate indicates that investing in pollution monitoring and forecasting in cities such as Lahore will lead to considerable welfare gain.

We show that increasing air pollution information and human-capital allows developing-country urbanites to make more accurate forecasts. Most strikingly, our one-hour forecast training reduced forecast error for incentivized predictions made up to six months later. Such exercises complement education and job trainings in the developing world. Policymakers could scale the debiasing lessons and exercises in our trainings via low-cost channels such as videos and video-games.

We also demonstrate that exposing developing-cities residents to air pollution information increases their willingness to pay for protective (N95) masks. This suggests that in areas where mask-wearing is not yet commonplace, information provision may spur residents to adopt N95 masks and avoid pollution through other means. Our finding that the average willingness to pay for masks is roughly 70 percent of the retail price indicates that modest subsidies could produce large changes in mask take-up, with concomitant health benefits.

Husnain F. Ahmad is  an Associate Professor of Economics, Sewanee at the University of the South.

Matthew Gibson is an Associate Professor of Economics at Williams College.

Fatiq Nadeem is a PhD Candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Sanval Nasim is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Colby College.

Arman Rezaee is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Davis. 

This blog has also been published on the IGC website.

Urbanization exists almost wholly as a response to the massive influx of people in urban cities like Lahore and Islamabad. Some of the reasons for this influx are provincial disparities, disproportionate impacts of climate change on farmers and fishermen, lack of rural development and employment opportunities, and a general belief that urban areas promise a better standard of living. This rapid rural-urban migration highlights a core dysfunctionality in Pakistan’s domestic policy i.e., the lack of implementation of positive policies to bridge the disparities between rural and urban areas (Urbanization in Pakistan,  2018). It is predicted that Punjab’s urban population is likely to increase to 52 million by 2025 and 59 million by 2030; meaning the addition of  1 million new residents every year (Government of Punjab, 2015). This rapid migration coupled with increasing population growth simmers down to a critical  demand i.e., more housing for urban populations. 

This blog focuses on the inequalities associated with the provision of housing – which indicates a broader trend of income inequality in the economy – and discusses how land is seen to be a site of private investment and competition. It then explores the long term implications of the current urbanization paradigm which include deepening gentrification and socio-economic stratification. 

Breaking down Urbanization

The act of providing housing to the general public in Pakistan somewhat follows the capitalist model of urbanization. This framework is characterized by capital accumulation and land possession for industrial development and megaprojects (Saleem, 2021). Administering this system in the state of Pakistan failed to consider one major loophole: the exclusion of the urban poor from development. The forcible accumulation and land possession more often than not disadvantages the poor who cannot evade this complex system. Mirroring David Harvey’s concept of Accumulation by Dispossession, the current model of urban development seeks to benefit a certain class of capitalists by dispossessing minorities of their rights, land, and livelihoods. Similarly, considering Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ Sociology of Absences, the urban poor, integral to the city’s economic and cultural webs, remain absent from the development-oriented thinking of policy-makers (Saleem, 2021). As a result, the system mimics the foundations of colonialism – an economic ploy that in the name of “modernization” and “development” ends in exploitation and displacement. By introducing higher cost housing and commercializing poor urban areas, it insists on disciplining and pushing out the poor (Malik, 2021). Official records suggest that 400,000 people in Karachi have been displaced from residential properties over the past two decades, due to infrastructure and development projects. The case is further complicated as said people are rendered into a permanent state of ‘limbo’ or ‘waiting’ for compensation. People are forced to indefinitely rely on the government resulting in an asymmetrical relationship of dependence (Anjum et al., 2022).

With the exclusion of the poor, new and improved housing can find its ideal residents with ease. This act of exclusion can be labeled as “durable inequality,” where it is argued that inequalities are not the natural outcomes of differences in abilities, talent, and motivation, but are the results of institutional and social relations that have been deliberately crafted by individuals and groups for their advantage (Ahmad., et al 2021).

Inequality of Urbanization & Formation of Slums

This inequality gives rise to a paradox in the urban space: hyper-modern elite housing communities on one side, and slums on the other. Roughly 30% of the settlements in Lahore are slums and two-thirds of the labor force (most of the informal economy) are estimated to live in these “kachi abadis”(Abubakar, 2016). This way of living is plagued with complications including lack of adequate living space, insufficient public goods provision, and poor quality basic amenities, all of which lead to poor health and low levels of human capital (Marx., et al 2013). Slums can be found across the city in areas like Shahdara, along Ferozepur Road as well as in newer developed areas like Johar Town. These settlements are generally located near open sewage channels or along the hazardous banks of River Ravi. (Ali & Khan, 2017) The issue is exacerbated by government inaction since the state takes limited responsibility for the residents of slums due to budget constraints, lack of clear policies and prioritization. Additionally, obtaining legalized status is nearly impossible due to which the inhabitants of slums do not invest in their homes in fear that they might be demolished anytime (Pervez, 2018). Slums encapsulate the incompetence of the state to provide basic services to its residents. Often left to their own devices, unregulated slums become inter-generational poverty traps. 

To deal with the challenge of inequality in housing and slums, rural-urban migration needs to be addressed in a way that reduces the annual influx of residents into urban cities. This can include providing reliable healthcare, housing, jobs and education in rural areas. Once this issue is tackled, the government should prioritize providing basic services to residents of slums and build up to its legalization so residents can live without the constant threat of demolition or displacement. Money could be invested to help build cemented houses as well as proper roads with drainage systems. (Pervez, 2018). The road to being a more prosperous nation is not linear nor does it depend on a fixed rubric of urbanization. The people are integral to Lahore’s prosperity and should be factored into the development agenda.

The rise of Gentrification

Running parallel to the inequality of urbanization is the more damaging impact of gentrification; a spatial phenomenon that involves changing economic, demographic, social, physical, and cultural landscapes (Yang, Hui & Lang, Li, 2018). Arguably, this is the most dangerous product of urbanization. The cycle of gentrification in the context of housing can be broken down this way: low-income people are increasingly priced out because of neo-liberal urbanization and can no longer move to gentrifying neighborhoods. The public and private sectors seek higher profits that can only be obtained through a new and more intensified regime of profitable land use and commercial exploitation (Chronopoulos, 2016).Unfortunately, in order to improve the livability of neighborhoods, the government fails to incorporate the ground realities that shape cities as communities, as well as design strategies aimed at encouraging interaction between people of diverse income groups (Saeed et al., 2019). 

An interesting case of gentrification is the case of the Old City in Lahore. The space has undergone a series of socio-spatial transformations under the World Bank funded operation to repair and preserve its historically significant architecture. Tawaifs (courtesans ), mirasis (hereditary musicians), and the Khwaja Sira, residents of the Shahi Mohalla (Royal Neighborhood) are among the individuals increasingly displaced by the “museumification” of the Old Neighborhood. The neighborhood which used to be considered a lifeline of the radio, television and film industry of Pakistan, is now a newly made food street enjoyed by the middle class (Hussein, n.d).  Although the case of the Old City is intrinsically different from the case of modern urbanization, it prompts the same realization: the consequences of modernization need to be considered in line with the preservation of Lahore and its people’s distinct identity. By pushing out rightful residents of areas and imposing housing to facilitate only the elite, it could be argued that Lahore might lose the history that makes it so charming and unique. To combat this complex condition, urbanization must be contextualized by the cultural history of Pakistan. 

Conclusion

Conceivably, Pakistan could achieve significant prosperity by reforming the urbanization framework to be more equal and representative of the population of cities like Lahore. By remaining true to the rich history of the state and taking into account marginalized communities that are otherwise disregarded in the process of modernization and development, more just and ethical development could possibly be achieved. This reform should include regulation of rural-urban migration, policies to develop rural areas and legalization of slums. By dealing with these core issues, the larger problems of slums, gentrification and rapid migrations could be relieved.

Natalia Bokhari is an intern at the Consortium for Development Policy Research. 

References

Ahmad, S., Ullah, S., & Wang, Y. P. (2021, November 5). Understanding Housing Inequalities in Urban Pakistan: An intersectionality perspective of ethnicity, income and education. Taylor and Francis Online. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/26884674.2021.1986442

Ali, S., & Khan, A. (2017, October 27). Lahore – a city of slums and shanties. Daily Times. https://dailytimes.com.pk/131048/lahore-city-slums-shanties/

Anjum, G., Toheed, M., & Anwar, N. H. (2021, December). Policy Brief #1_ land, governance, & the gendered politics of … ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358226924_KUL_URDU_POLICY_BRIEF_1_Land_Governance_the_Gendered_Politics_of_Displacement_in_Urban_Pakistan

Chronopoulos, T. (2016, September 28). African Americans, gentrification, and neoliberal urbanization: The case of fort greene, Brooklyn . SpringerLink. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12111-016-9332-6#Sec4

Government of Punjab. (2015). Urban development sector plan – Punjab, Pakistan. https://pnd.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/Punjab_Urban_Development_Sector_Plan_2015_2.pdf

Javed, U. (2014, January 20). Lahore’s prosperity. DAWN.COM. https://www.dawn.com/news/1081457

Malik, R. (2021, August 10). Lahore’s Post-colonial Food Culture. The Students’ Herald. https://thestudentsherald.com/lahores-postcolonial-food-culture/

Marx, B., Stoker, T., & Suri, T. (2013). The Economics of Slums in the Developing World. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23560028

Pervez, S. (2018). Conditions of slums in Pakistan are getting increasingly worse: Policy Analysis. LUMS . https://cbs.lums.edu.pk/student-research-series/conditions-slums-pakistan-are-getting-increasingly-worse-policy-analysis

Profiles of underserved areas of 08 largest cities of Pakistan – UNICEF. (2020). https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/media/2926/file/Profiles%20of%20Underserved%20Areas%20of%2008%20Largest%20Cities%20of%20Pakistan.pdf

Saeed, A. (2023, April 20). Home. The Students’ Herald. https://thestudentsherald.com/the-problem-with-the-utopia-of-urban-development-in-lahore/

Saeed, R., Khan, D., Naeem, A., Rafae, M., Yazdani, R., Sultana, W., Naeem, M., Manzar, Z., Insha, M., Fatima, T. e, & Shahid, M. (2019, December 29). Lahore: Of Diversity and inclusivity: Shehr. thenews. https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/590082-of-diversity-and-inclusivity

Saleem, S. (2021, July 26). Inclusive gentrification: Presenting the “absent” in the urban development of Karachi. South Asia@LSE. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2021/07/26/inclusive-gentrification-presenting-the-absent-in-the-urban-development-of-karachi/

Sociospatial perspective. Securipedia. (2013). https://securipedia.eu/index.php/Sociospatial_perspective

UKEssays, Uke. (2023, March 21). Urbanization in Pakistan. UKEssays. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/urbanization-in-pakistan-economics-essay.php 

Yang, J., Hui, E. C. M., Lang, W., & Li, X. (2018, June 13). Land ownership, rent-seeking, and rural gentrification: Reconstructing villages for sustainable urbanization in China. MDPI. https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/6/1997 

For too long, Pakistan’s justice system has been daunted by an endemic lack of capacity to administer justice, especially to poor citizens unversed in the law. It is difficult to pursue fairness and justice in the country, as citizens often find themselves hedged in by a number of institutional and social obstacles in trying to access the police and courts. This leads to mounting dissatisfaction with legal institutions and causes citizens to disengage with the state—to the point of not seeking them out in case of disputes.

This blog draws attention to the main barriers to accessing justice with a focus on social barriers—principally clientelism—to explain their role in conditioning the relationship between citizens and legal institutions.

There are several institutional barriers that block access to justice. These barriers are baked into the legal system itself. They raise the costs of accessing justice, which is a legitimate concern. Most poor people hold back from seeking out formal legal institutions simply because they cannot afford them (Sandefur, 2010). There are three types of institutional barriers that are a critical tipping point in raising the costs of accessing justice — physical, financial and legitimacy barriers (Shami, 2021).

 

Distance matters

Physical barriers are related to physical distance. In most developing societies, judicial buildings are located within cities, becoming largely inaccessible to people living in rural areas (Vapnek et al., 2016). Traveling long distances is expensive and takes up too much time. In Afghanistan, for example, Afghans living in the countryside are largely cut off from courthouses and other judicial bodies because they are located in the main cities, far out of reach of the rural populace (Jensen, 2011). In Pakistan, due to long distances to courts, the poor—especially women—face high costs of accessing formal justice institutions (Chaudhary, 1999). As a result, varying local folk systems of law like Panchayats step in to take their place in the village and tribal areas (Acemoglu et al., 2019). The authority and trust in the state are dangerously undermined in the process.

 

High costs

The financial costs of judicial services are also prohibitively high sometimes, making them inaccessible to the rural poor. Due to slow procedures and high caseload, court cases become prolonged for long periods significantly increasing costs (Maru, 2009). For example, the resolution of an inheritance case can take around two years on average with anywhere between 5,000 PKR and 200,000 PKR in costs. Business-related cases are resolved faster, but sometimes even they can take around six months with high costs for the people involved (Siddique, 2013). Apart from formal costs associated with judicial services, people also bear the brunt of informal costs arising from corruption and bribery. A survey done in Southern Punjab in Pakistan showed that many respondents had to pay bribes to judges and court administrators to use their services (Galway Development Services International, 2015).

 

Legitimacy concerns

Confidence in legal institutions in Pakistan is considerably low. A deep-rooted mistrust of legal institutions leads to reduced demand for legal solutions for resolving disputes (Shami, 2021) and exacerbates disillusionment with dispute resolution bodies (Jackson et al., 2014). This could be due to pervasive corruption, harassment, unfair treatment, and/or ineffectiveness (Tankebe, 2010). A distrust of the police and courts erodes the legitimacy of formal institutions and ultimately obstructs access to justice, especially in developing countries.

This has enabled powerful non-state actors to step in and replace state actors by providing competing services such as dispute resolution, protection and public goods. Commonly, low levels of access to and trust in the state fuel closer associations with Panchayats—the primary alternative to state courts in rural Pakistan. Panchayats consist of village elders and notable locals, whose rulings typically depend on cultural norms and go against the laws promulgated by the Pakistani state (Acemoglu et al., 2019). Hence, a lack of legitimacy of the state actors leads to the spread of non-state dispute resolution forums and spawns widespread discontent.

 

Clientelism and the case of rural Hafizabad

 It goes without saying that removing institutional barriers is important for the health of the judicial system and institutional reforms are effective in making justice more accessible. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge social barriers to justice such as race, ethnicity, and gender. While a great deal of scholarship has focused on institutional barriers, it still needs to pick up the social facets of these barriers, particularly barriers arising from asymmetric power relations or clientelism.

Clientelism is a face-to-face exchange relationship between unequal groups — patrons/landlords and clients (Mason, 1986). On the one hand, there are clients who have little to no assets. On the other, there are patrons who are figures of authority with command over resources and who are responsible for ensuring that their client’s basic needs are met (Powell, 1970). Patrons deliver goods and services such as employment, housing, protection, and dispute resolution. In return, clients offer cheap labor and electoral support to shore up the patron’s popularity (Scott and Kerkvliet, 2017).

The exchange in clientelism depends on the relative bargaining power of the two sides. Unsurprisingly, patrons have greater bargaining power and hence stronger control over their clients. This in turn allows patrons to regulate their clients’ third-party interactions (Basu, 1986) including the way that they access the police or courts (Shami, 2021). Clients normally comply with their patrons’ demands so that they don’t lose all access to the patrons’ resources.

While clientelism has its roots running deep across Pakistan, rural Hafizabad in Punjab particularly demonstrates the salience of clientelism in defining access to justice for rural citizens.  Hafizabad is a rice-producing district with entrenched inequality and strong clientelistic nexuses (Shami, 2012). There are two types of villages in the district — “landlord-dominated” villages and “peasant-based” villages (Shami, 2021). After link roads were constructed in 1998, villages that were isolated earlier became connected to main cities. This allows for an additional comparison between isolated and connected villages. Data collected from these villages help in explaining the role of clientelistic power relations in conditioning access to justice.

In peasant-based villages, a disproportionately higher percentage of households are willing to seek judicial services in case of disputes than in landlord-dominated villages. In landlord-based villages, landlords wield their power to accompany their clients to the police or courts, making them less inclined to access the official judicial system. In peasant-based villages however, landlords do not have such power (Shami, 2021). Additionally, it becomes apparent that patrons are able to maintain patronage powers when inequality becomes coupled with isolation. When villages become connected to the city, there is a greater chance that people living in those villages would go to the police independently (Shami, 2021).

The judicial system in Pakistan finds itself starved of resources while facing impossible caseloads. To make things worse, clientelistic challenges are increasingly on the rise. To overcome these challenges, state institutions need to become more accessible. For example, the situation in rural Hafizabad crucially points to the need for increasing villagers’ access to formal policing. A way to do so would be to connect villages to the external market so that villagers can go to the police directly. This will—at least partly—wrest power away from the landlords and make villagers more aware of the value of the relationship with their patrons. Thus, to truly change the way justice is pursued in the country, changes that are feasible and would have substantial, long-lasting effects need to be made all around—at institutional, physical, and social levels.

 

References:

Acemoglu, D., Cheema, A., Khwaja, A., & Robinson, J. (2018b). Trust in State and Non-State Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan. The University of Chicago Journals.

Galway Development Services International. (2015), EU Punjab Access to Juctice Project: Public Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions of Justice: Report of a Household Survey in Southern Punjab Districts. https://www.pdffiller.com/398193371-EU-PA2J-Baseline-Study-Report-March-2015pdf-Legal-Advisory-and-Representational-Services-in-South-Punjab

Jensen, K. (2011), ‘Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice System in Rural Afghanistan’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18: 929–50.

Maru, V. (2009), ‘Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment: A Review of World Bank Practice’, Justice and Development Working Paper Series 9.

Mason, D. (1986), ‘Land Reform and the Breakdown of Clientelist Politics in El Salvador’, Comparative Political Studies, 18: 487–516.

Powell, J. D. (1970), ‘Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics’, American Political Science Review, 64: 411–25. Sandefur, R. L. (2010), ‘Classical Approaches and New Directions’, in R. L. Sandefur, ed. Access to Justice: Classical Approaches and New Directions. Emerald/JAI Press.

Shami, M. (2021). Access to Justice in Clientelist Networks. The British Journal of Criminology, 62(2), 337–358.

 

Izza Malik is a Research Assistant at the Consortium for Development Policy Research.