How should we think about Pakistan’s middle class?

gettyimages-102008417-event

By Shehryar Nabi

Pakistan’s expanding, largely urban middle class shows a country far different from its traditional poles of poor and elite.

How should we understand Pakistan’s middle class – a phenomenon inseparable from its economic and political future?

On October 31st, the Lahore-based Consortium for Development Policy Research co-organized an event with the Urban Institute in Washington D.C. to assess this question. The event featured a panel of researchers studying middle class trends both globally and in Pakistan.

Here are key takeaways from the conversation:

We know the middle class is growing, but it remains ill-defined

There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of the middle class in Pakistan. Go to any major city, and you will see consumerist lifestyles that, as described by World Bank Economist Ghazala Mansuri at the event, are free from the depravations of poverty but still depend on public services that the rich opt-out of.

But how big is the middle class in numbers?

There are two government sources used to size up Pakistan’s middle class: National income accounts and household consumption surveys. Combining these measures, and using the global middle class definition of $11 to $110 in daily income[1], Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Homi Kharas found that about 50 million Pakistanis are middle class, comprising 27 percent of the population. By 2030, that number is forecast to reach 160 million people, 66 percent of its population. That would make it the 13th largest middle class in the world.[2]

Mansuri commented that economic definitions of the middle class can vary wildly, making these figures imprecise. But existing measures at least confirm that Pakistan’s transition to a middle class society is in full swing.

How the middle class changes society

The rise of Pakistan’s middle class has broad implications for society, detailed at the event by Homi Kharas.

Firstly, the rise of the middle class has a varied effect on climate change. On the one hand, a growing middle class exacerbates climate change by increasing overall consumption, and thus carbon emissions. On the other hand, the middle class tends to be educated and live in smaller households, both of which are associated with lower carbon footprints.

The middle class also has an important effect on population growth. Pakistan’s fertility rate has been declining since the 1980s, and a growing middle class is likely to slow down population growth even more. If this is indeed the case, then the projection of the middle class described above would be too high because it does not account for a lower fertility rate.

Demand for education, the surest pathway for moving up the socioeconomic ladder, is driven up by the middle class.

Will the middle class strengthen democratic institutions? Kharas remarked that global experience suggests that rising prosperity and authoritarian government are by no means mutually exclusive. Nor are existing democratic institutions necessarily safeguarded by the middle class.

Kharas observed that because the middle class tends to demand public services, political tensions can stem from service delivery failures that spark distrust in the government. The evidence on this is in Pakistan mixed. A recent survey in Lahore shows that public service delivery is high on the minds of voters. Yet despite public service delivery failures – which Ghazala Mansuri pointed out have remained especially dire in Karachi despite a growing middle class – the expected political reaction has not been pronounced. This suggests that the middle class is not mobilized to demand accountability for service delivery through the political system.

The rise of the middle class does not guarantee gender equality

There are intuitive reasons why a rising middle class anticipates better outcomes for women. Middle class incomes may be driven by women earners in the family, increasing demand for their education, and in effect empowering them to make choices beyond the constraints of patriarchal norms.

But the evidence from Pakistan shows the path to empowerment is not so straightforward.

Drawing on data from 2005 to 2015, Urban Institute Research Associate Reehana Raza first pointed to trends that suggest a positive impact of middle class growth on women’s empowerment. In urban areas, which are strongly associated with the middle class, women’s enrollment in secondary education increased by 10 percent. Women’s enrollment in tertiary education grew from 200,000 to 600,000. Raza also found that income returns for each additional year of schooling are higher for women than for men.

However, this isn’t translating into substantial gains in employment. Although women’s employment is on an upward trend, only 25 percent participate in the labor market. Just 20 percent of women with a bachelor’s degree enter the labor market. Women who seek employment tend to do so after receiving at least ten years of schooling, whereas men can find work at any level of education. Raza concluded that while high income returns demonstrate an opportunity for women to benefit from education, it isn’t being reflected in Pakistan’s workforce.

Does the middle class increase women’s political representation? According to ongoing research in Lahore led by Ali Cheema, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, the gender gap between men and women’s votes remains high in urban areas where the middle class has grown. Ali Cheema discussed what his research shows about the gender gap at the event.

One theory is that patriarchal norms at the household deny women their right to vote, or their votes are decided for them. But Cheema’s team found a different story. Women are in fact not prohibited from voting, and voting decisions are largely their own. They also found that divergences in women and men’s votes can have important consequences for electoral outcomes.

A different explanation offered by Cheema is the persistence of patriarchal norms at the party level. Cheema’s team found that party organizers and the movements they build are overwhelmingly male. This suggests they are unengaged with potential women voters.

Surveys conducted earlier this year by Cheema’s team show that women feel invisible to political parties, leaving them unenthusiastic about elections. Women are 21 percent more likely than their male counterparts to strongly agree that political parties are only interested in men’s votes.

Cheema argued that to reduce the gender gap in voter turnout, there needs to be a greater focus on the exclusionary tendencies of existing political structures even where the middle class is growing.

What we need to sustain middle class growth

Pakistan’s middle class surge is not inevitable if economic, social, and political structures remain as they are. At the event, ways to ensure the middle class’s continued expansion were floated with the audience for discussion.

Homi Kharas argued that the future of middle class jobs will not be in the manufacturing sector, the conventional pathway from lower to middle-income country status. Rather it will be in services – education, health, banking, telecommunications, etc. Kharas highlighted that the dynamism of the services sector creates wide opportunities in the job market. However, services will have to be tradable to drive middle class growth. Right now, however, Pakistan does not have internationally competitive services other than migrant labor.

A neglected avenue of middle class growth, Ghazala Mansuri argued, is agriculture. Mansuri stressed that the largely urban phenomenon of the middle class should not lead to the neglect of rural areas, which currently suffer from low productivity and poor service delivery.

The final, but highly important priority emphasized by Kharas is increasing women’s employment. Pakistan’s middle class is exceptional in how few women enter the labor market. For other middle-income countries, like China and Malaysia, incorporating women into the workforce was pivotal for overcoming widespread poverty and raising living standards. Unless social and structural barriers that prevent women’s labor force participation are removed, sustaining Pakistan’s middle class will be a challenge.

Shehryar Nabi is a communications associate at the Consortium for Development Policy Research.

[1] However, middle class trends have been observed among Pakistanis earning $5 to $10 per day.

[2] Kharas added a big caveat to his methodology. If you judged Pakistan’s by its national income accounts, it would be slightly richer than Bangladesh. But if you just looked at household consumption surveys, which do not account for 60 percent of national income, Pakistan would be poorer than Kenya or Cameroon. Household surveys fall short because questionnaires miss several modes of consumption, omit the informal sector, and are often unanswered by the top 10 percent.  

Pakistan’s sixth population census: Expected and surprising figures on urban growth

KarachiGadap

By Hina Shaikh

Many have observed that Pakistan’s cities are growing fast, but until now that change has not been captured with the exacting data of a census. They would be surprised to find that according to provisional results of the new census, Pakistan is now only 36 percent urban despite a 30 percent increase in the urban growth rate since 1998.

The results have sparked debate around the integrity of this data and its implications on policymaking, political representation, and resource allocation in cities. Social scientists, economists, and urban experts strongly endorse revisiting the definition of the term “urban” to enable policy decisions that are grounded in reality. They also believe definitional anomalies remain the predominant reason for why urban population estimates appear out of sync with expectations.

If the provisional results related to the urban count are accurate, what do they tell us? Here is a table with the official results:

Figure 1: Urban/Rural population figures, Census 2017
CensusTableSource: http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/

Some key takeaways:

Pakistan’s overall urban growth has been slower than expected

While the overall population count surpasses all previous estimates, the provisional results confirm only a marginal increase in the share of urban population, up to 36.7 from 32.5 percent in 1998. In fact, most of the population is still rural in Pakistan, with results showing a tapering off in the rate of urbanization from an annual 3.5 to 2.7 percent since the last inter-censal (1981-1998) period. This is surprising as even the 1998 census is believed by researchers to underestimate the urban population by at least 10 percentage points.

Figure 2: Population of major cities, Census 2017
populationmajorcities.jpgSource: http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/

The highest estimate for 2017 was by National Institute of Population Sciences that had forecast a population of 200 million; Economic Survey 2017 had the figure of 199 million whereas UN’s population division’s 2017 forecast for Pakistan were 196.7 million.

But urban centers have grown explosively – with one exception

A fifth of all Pakistanis now live in just 10 cities, with Quetta, Lahore, and Faisalabad showing the largest percentage increases in population amongst these cities. The changing population distribution toward larger cities versus smaller, intermediary cities reflects an increase in the number, size, and sprawl of cities across provinces but also highlights some interesting findings and anomalies.

Contrary to some projections that Karachi’s population would be over 20 million, its ratio vis-à-vis the rest of the province remained unchanged. Urban Karachi shows an annual average growth rate of 2.4 percent, lower than the national average at 2.7 percent. Given that Karachi is the biggest urban economic hub of Pakistan it may be difficult to grasp that growth has not just levelled off but in fact slowed down in the city compared to a much faster average growth for urban Pakistan.

What is more surprising is that Islamabad’s rural population has grown at 6.95 percent per year since the last census. Anyone who is familiar with Islamabad knows there are barely any “rural” localities in the city.

Quetta’s population has also expanded rapidly – its urban population has grown by almost 3.5 percent. This could not have happened without the first-ever counting of Afghan refugees, which is a welcome step by the census administration because policymakers should be interested in the total number of residents regardless of their legal status. However, this practice should be consistent for all regions across Pakistan.

Urban and rural household sizes are nearly equal

Another interesting trend is the parity in urban and rural household size. In all four provinces, urban and rural household size (measured as number of people per house) is almost the same. In fact, in a total reversal from the 1998 census, Sindh’s urban household size (5.6) is larger than rural (5.4). What is usually expected is that urban household sizes are significantly smaller than rural household sizes. A lower mean size of households in rural areas can be partly due to out-migration of household members to urban areas. This trend seems to have intensified in Punjab as well: the lower rural population growth rate has slowed down (1.8 percent) compared to urban growth (2.7 percent).

Provincial shares of the overall population remain constant

Figure 3: Urban share of provincial population, Censuses 1981, 1998, 2017
ProvincialPopShares
Source: http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/

Despite massive in-migration in the inter-censal period, provincial population shares see little change. Experts find this surprising especially as it leads to minimal adjustments in the division of parliamentary seats across provinces. The total population share for Sindh is unchanged, while the share of its rural population increased by more than 50 percent. This is in sharp contrast to Punjab, where its rural population grew by far less than the national average.

So what is going on here? These figures seem off – either inflated or underestimated – largely due to definitional issues.

Defining “urban”

One of the reasons for the discrepancies observed is the varying understanding by provincial governments of what constitutes as “urban”.

The definition of an urban area followed by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) in 2017, as in 1998, is a municipal corporation, a town committee, or a cantonment board are administratively classified as urban. This is actually a step back from the definitions used in the 1951 and 1961 censuses where even areas with certain “urban characteristics” were classified as urban.

Characteristics of rural regions change over time. Hence, classifying any region that does not fall neatly within an urban center as rural may not be correct. For instance, access to basic utilities such as water, electricity, mobile phones, and internet connectivity are no longer purely urban features.

Work by several urban experts, such as Reza Ali, provides ample evidence to support this thinking. His path breaking research estimates the scale of urbanization in Pakistan since the 1990s. Ali shows how binary, official definitions of ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ remain insufficient and he suggests that the distinction between the two should be considered more like a transition along a gradient.

Since the last census, researchers have also documented how “ribbons of development” have evolved. These are pockets of urbanization along highways, between major cities, and industrial zones that are still classified as rural. The World Bank has also reported this phenomenon, describing Pakistan’s urbanization as “messy and hidden” due to the proliferation of a low density urban sprawl, slums, and growth of cities beyond administrative boundaries that define urban centers. The United Nations also reports that by 2015, 22 percent of the Pakistani population had been living in urban agglomerations of more than a million people.

How definitional concerns affected the census

In some cases, the suburban/peri-urban outgrowth of cities are marked as rural. As city limits are not frequently revised to reflect this growth, most of it is considered outside of cities. For example, the 1998 census marked Lahore’s Defence Housing Authority, the Lahore Development Authority, and private housing schemes as rural. In the 2017 census, Islamabad’s Bahria Town is marked as rural.

Sindh’s elevation into a majority urban province – 52 percent compared to 48.9 percent (as per the 1998 census) of its population is urban – can most likely be attributed to the designation of areas previously considered rural as urban (apart from the wave of migrants from KP due to conflict).

Also, the far lower than expected difference between the populations of Lahore (11.3 million) and Karachi (14.9 million) warrants a closer look. A more than 100 percent increase in Lahore’s population could be due to the expansion of the city’s borders – reclassification by the provincial government – to include areas formerly counted as rural. However, Sindh has been most vocal about its reservation to accept these results and feels the population of the entire province, not just Karachi, has been undercounted. A big question mark is that almost five million residents of Karachi are declared rural residents as two major districts of the city – Malir and Korangi – are marked as rural.

There is also no standard definition of urban vis-a-vis rural in Pakistan. Some cities in Punjab have an urban-rural divide, while others are entirely urban.

Conclusion

While underestimating the scale of urbanization through definitional interventions may benefit political parties with a strong rural base, the worrying fact remains that Pakistan has added at least 30 million people to its urban population in the last 19 years. Without a appropriate policies, another 100 million will be added to this by 2050 if current growth rates persist.

Rapid urbanization is challenging the flimsy infrastructure of cities. Rising population density also has implications for pollution, waste management and climate change that policymakers need to start focusing on. According to the Global Liveability Report 2017, Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi is also its least livable, ranked at 134 out of 140 cities.

After a delay of 19 long years, even basic changes may appear monumental once accumulated. However, without census data, policy planning is not much better than guesswork. The research community will be excited about using new data, however it will take some time before these results find a way into result-oriented strategies and policies.

In honor of exiles: A discussion of Osama Siddique’s “Snuffing Out the Moon”

SOTMCover

By Shehryar Nabi

Regime change never seems to quell the same struggle that has persisted since stories have been told: the struggle between authority and dissent.

This was the sense that Osama Siddique imagined was familiar across epochs in his time-traveling debut novel, Snuffing Out the Moon.

Speaking on August 8th to a live audience with Faisal Bari, Director of the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), and Ayesha Jalal, Tufts University Professor and eminent historian of South Asia, Siddique discussed the themes and motivations that shaped his new book. This is Siddique’s first foray into literature – he is otherwise known as a widely-published legal scholar who has held numerous advisory and academic positions with institutions such as the Lahore University of Management Science (LUMS), IDEAS, and Harvard Law School.

Set in what is today Pakistan, Snuffing Out the Moon progresses over six eras: Mohenjo Daro, Taxila, the Moghul Empire under Jahangir, the fall of the Moghul Empire in 1857, Lahore in 2009 during the Lawyers’ Movement, and 2084, a future where South Asia is controlled by water conglomerates. The plot is not contiguous across eras, each of which marks a new story with new characters. This narrative style allowed Siddique to animate the novel with the different sights, sounds, and smells of changing realities. It also afforded him the opportunity to write with a diversity of idioms unique to each era.

But Siddique’s true aim was to convey the recurring nature of oppressive power, the common folk’s struggle to cope with it, and most importantly, the beacon of resistance. Within this paradigm he explored how illusions, omens, loathing, passion, and dissent play out in a way that, as Mark Twain allegedly put it, “rhyme” over history. These themes cohered the disparate stories.

“Can I do something which can actually tell multiple stories which have nothing to do with each other and yet have everything to do with each other?” Siddique said he asked himself this question when considering the novel’s structure.

He also cited Qurratulain Hyder’s Urdu-language novel Aag Ka Darya – which took place across different historical eras – as a key influence on the book.

“That work had a huge impact on me aesthetically, in terms of its imagination, in terms of what it set out to do,” he said.

In Snuffing Out the Moon, the light of human spirit championed in resisters co-exists with the darkness of reality. To dissent is to exile, whether breaking physically from society or mentally from your peers, or both. No resistance is ever the same – a teacher and an armed rebel could both find themselves in the dissenting camp. But regardless of the form it takes, resistance necessitates at least some degree of suffering as the price for espousing norm-breaking ideals.

Using this as the central tension driving the stories of rebel protagonists, Siddique makes them out to be the real idols of history. Greatness is not being a king or general, but an exile surviving on the margins of accepted thought.

“There was a very conscious effort to create heroic figures out of dissenters. I wanted to do my little bit in terms of highlighting the sacrifice, the independence of mind, the self-abnegation that goes into being a dissenter,” Siddique said.

Ayesha Jalal asked Siddique about how his background in law informed the book. Siddique first made clear what kind of legal scholar he is. He takes less interest in high profile cases such as the Panama leaks, and rather focuses his research on law as a sociological phenomenon: how law creates hegemony, how it is used to coerce, and how it provides unequal benefits depending on class, gender, and other categories.

This understanding of legal regimes and power – which he has spent a career explaining in books and papers – is re-imagined in the book through the perspectives of people who have to endure them.

“What I’ve tried to do is take everyday characters and show how they interplay with the formal legal system . . . it has a presence and a reputation which is looked upon as something which is sacred – you can’t question it,” Siddique said.

Following this discussion of the sociological dimension of law, Siddique promised that the book would explore these ideas without sounding academic.

“It’s a bit more interesting in the book, I assure you,” he said.

Why should we care about dissent today? Siddique pointed to the rising ethnonationalism and constant monitoring of personal data that characterize our world.

“There is a very interesting move back to majoritarianism, a very interesting move to almost fascism, a very interesting Orwellian control of information,” he said.

That people find their own ways to resist in every age, as Siddique asserts in his book, gives reason for hope. Those well-versed in the work of celebrated poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz will see this idea touched upon in the book’s title, taken from a poem Faiz wrote about being held as a political prisoner. The poem counteracts the grief of imprisonment with the knowledge that the powerful will ultimately lose power, while truth will survive. No matter how much power accumulates, it cannot “snuff out the moon”.

Listen to Osama Siddique read an excerpt from “The Book of Loathing” in Snuffing Out the Moon:

Photos from the event

SOTM 3

SOTM 2

SOTM 8

SOTM 1

SOTM 6

SOTM 5

SOTM 7

SOTM 9

Shehryar Nabi is a communications and advocacy coordinator at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS) and a communications associate at the Consortium for Development Policy Research (CDPR). You can follow him on Twitter @shehrnabi.  

Panama verdict: Behind most discontents lies a legal judgement

PanamaVerdictWhiteStarMohammadAsimMohammed Asim, White Star

By Osama Siddique

It is almost imperative for anyone who wants to be taken seriously these days to comment on the Panama Papers case. So here is my endeavour. But allow me first to provide some context.

Pakistan faces a crisis of justice. That is to say very few criminals are brought to justice and quite a few innocents are unjustly punished. A majority of criminal prosecutions fail due to obsolete evidentiary laws and equally obsolete judicial approaches.

The system also furnishes many legal and procedural loopholes to the mighty and the resourceful and offers few protections for the weak and vulnerable. Meanwhile, civil disputes take years to resolve in our courts, thereby consuming innumerable lives, wasting financial resources and often forcing the desperate or the opportunist to resort to criminal means.

Many people are also forced to settle their claims outside courtrooms — frequently with inequitable outcomes due to the inequality of bargaining power.

Such is the state of affairs at the institution entrusted with the delivery of justice that people have little confidence in the effectiveness of the judiciary. But you will seldom hear this being analysed in any great depth or with necessary seriousness from the ordinary citizens’ point of view. It is a yawn-inducing topic, not exciting and sensational enough to become the stuff of prime-time television.

To make matters worse, instead of frenetic efforts to assert itself, the judiciary appears to be on the retreat. The most recent capitulation is the meek surrendering yet again of the vital task of trying and holding terrorists accountable to military courts. The existence of a parallel and opaque system to punish crime only highlights the inadequacy of the mainstream criminal justice system.

This is quite apart from the separate and serious concerns regarding the military courts’ compliance with due process and human rights safeguards. There is a general tendency to think of such things as first world niceties in a country besieged by brutal terrorism. However, a state without a higher moral ground can eventually become indistinguishable from the violent and the lawless.

I digressed. I meant to discuss the Panama Papers case. But do indulge me a little more as I need to first broadly outline the main players in our system of justice as well as their respective challenges, for that is the milieu in which this case was adjudicated and decided. It is true that this system is fractured at several levels.

The police still searches for a clear post-colonial vision of goals and governance, lacks autonomy, has poor technical skills and faces many 21st century challenges with 20th century equipment and a 19th century mindset. The prosecution is fledgling, under-resourced, under-confident and, therefore, inadequate.

The prisons are unfamiliar with the concept of rehabilitation and probations, and parole services exist largely as concepts on paper. The judiciary often blames all these institutions for the overall failure of the criminal justice system.

There are two important things to note here. First, over the past few years – essentially in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – there are quite a few positives to report in all these departments and there are statistics to back improved performance (more on this at another time).

Second, these institutions are at least open to debate and critique, have mechanisms for political and public accountability and can boast of internal reform dialogues. Their internal state of affairs is not as fossilised as it may appear from the outside — there is some movement.

That cannot really be claimed about their biggest critic – the judiciary – which essentially remains aloof from reformation. Let us briefly examine this vital institution both empirically and sociologically. First, the crucial performance indication numbers – those that show delay and pendency – are not heartening to say the least.

More cases continue to come to courts than is desirable — more than the courts dispose or can ever dispose (the filters are weak; litigation is a convenient weapon to coerce and embroil one’s opponents, and to delay any official and administrative actions; there are also growing disputes in society).

More and more cases also remain stuck in courts despite some past attempts to clear backlog. Consequently, the gaps between case institution on the one hand and case pendency, as well as case disposals on the other, are growing.

While efficiency remains unequivocally a problem, quality of justice is also facing many challenges. Various publicly available surveys, scholarly writings and credible reports as well as any random conversation with citizens anywhere will highlight the huge problems there.

Institutional governance, on the other hand, is unbelievably hierarchical and centralised — all power essentially vests in the chief justices and there is no recourse if they simply dislike change. There is also no institutional pressure on them to change; the growing din of discontent in the streets notwithstanding.

The institutional culture, as a result, is one that promotes unquestioning servility, lack of initiative and embedded mediocrity amongst those occupying the lower rungs of the judiciary.

Administrative and support staff invariably lack the skill set required for tasks entrusted to them. Courts remain staunchly resistant to modern administrative frameworks for smoother operations and just, quick outcomes, such as a Case Flow Management System — something so fundamental and necessary that modern judiciaries have embraced it all across the globe.

As a consequence, there are no time limits for decisions of cases, no real judicial control over the pace of proceedings, increasingly recalcitrant lawyers, no willingness or viable mechanism for thwarting frivolous litigation and delaying tactics, and no overall judicial policy and mission.

Decision-making remains uninformed by data, performance evaluation operates on hearsay, record-keeping is abysmal and the language of justice and its beguiling processes are alien and alienating for the majority of citizens.

Let us now get back to the Panama Papers case — a case, above all, about merit and accountability. But surely it is important to first look at the judiciary’s own established safeguards to uphold the same. The judiciary often holds forth on the value of merit, transparency and accountability in other institutions. Yet it remains the only major institution where recruitment – or elevation as they prefer to call it – to the appellate courts is based on the preferences of a small group of insiders.

A constitutional endeavour to introduce a two-tier system for politically and publicly accountable judicial appointments was paralysed as the judiciary held on strongly to the rather indefensible principle of being answerable to itself alone, despite the risk of collusion and nepotism in any such scenario. The status quo, the judges insisted, ensured vital independence.

The judiciary also remains resolute that it would not agree to anything other than self-accountability. The Supreme Judicial Council and its pitifully small number of cases in the distant – and murky – past is all that there is to show for self-accountability.

Not to forget that if at all a judge finds themselves cornered into a position where they may be held accountable, they can conveniently resign and leave with all post-retirement benefits intact.

All this, of course, pertains to instances of corruption or delinquency — there is really no accountability whatsoever if an appellate judge simply does not work and spends an entire career writing nothing of note, or alternatively, writes judgments so poor that society would have gained if they had remained unwritten.

All the while we have to remember that provincial high courts are also responsible for administration of justice in their respective provinces — the aforementioned inaction or ineptitude for action, thus, adversely impacts hundreds of millions.

I should really now focus on the Panama Papers case but there is also the small matter of history. Legitimation of coups, authentication of dissolutions of elected governments under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution, opportunistic use of public interest litigation for holding forth over political contestations, chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s brand of judicialization of politics, use of populism for self-aggrandizement and creation of a political constituency — it is a checkered institutional story indeed.

All constitutional courts are at some level political. However, in our context a combination of political upheavals, ambitious military, constitutional design and some opportunistic individuals have generated a jurisprudence on adjudication of political questions that continues to surprise and at times shock jurists and commentators all over the world. As a result, our judiciary is perhaps more political and politicized than its counterparts elsewhere.

Let us also not forget that there have been other cases like the one on Panama Papers. In the past too, we, as a nation, have spent months following seemingly interminable courtroom dramas that have resulted in judgments that comprise hundreds of pages.

During those injudicious times also, politics was brought to a standstill and desirable ways of ensuring democratic transitions, promoting political governance and resolving disputes within a federation were sidelined and discarded in favor of televised spectacles.

This, even though the challenges faced by politics actually needed more politics to resolve things. Court-administered prescriptions, thus, were unsuitable remedies, if not fatally wrong ones. This, despite many past experiences of the judiciary itself suffering and creating suffering whenever burdened by matters beyond its capacity and jurisdiction.

Add to all this its inherent unaccountability if and when it got it wrong. As if there was not already enough for the judges to do by way of protecting rights, punishing crime and resolving disputes. As if all that was being adequately done.

So when the latest court drama fever engulfed the nation, I found myself unable to offer anything even when everyone and their electrician could. And so everyone rightly suspected that I knew little of such matters. For how could someone not follow something so monumental and not believe that this judgment – this judgment alone and on its very own – will end all systemic corruption in Pakistan, firmly establish a robust system of public accountability and chalk out a clear and comprehensive future roadmap for the nation.

I confess that I remain tongue-tied still. All I can say is that let the citizens do politics. And let the judges do justice — justice for ordinary people, in everyday matters, in mainstream as well as far-flung places and on a daily basis. For that is what really matters to the people. And yet that is what never gets prioritized.

Osama Siddique is an Associate Fellow at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), the inaugural Henry J Steiner Visiting Professor in Human Rights at Harvard Law School, and is the author of ‘Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice’. His debut novel ‘Snuffing Out the Moon’ will be published by Penguin Random House in 2017.

This article originally appeared in The Herald on May 30, 2017.

Whose voice really counts? Machine politics and citizen voice aggregation in emerging democracies

Election-Posters-4_Public

By Ali Cheema, Asad Liaqat and Shandana Khan Mohmand

A central feature of democracy is that political parties aggregate citizen voice, and transform it into political mandates and programmatic policies when they form governments. Political parties are thus a central channel for making citizens’ voices count towards policies. The effectiveness with which political parties aggregate voice and how responsive policies are to the preferences expressed by their voter bases are important metrics for the strength of democracy. Recent experiences across the globe have cast doubt on how effectively these two aspects of democracy are working.

In the UK, for example, the Brexit vote revealed how disconnected party elites were from their voter bases. It also showed a widening gap between the policies that parties adopt and the preferences of their voter bases and party members. The resulting crisis of legitimacy of political party elites has emerged as an important point of discussion in western democracy.

In spite of the growing recognition of this issue in established democracies, there is little work on how well voice aggregation and policy responsiveness is working in emerging democracies. At the heart of this are the questions of how parties organize to aggregate voice, and what mechanisms ensure that this voice is reflected in policy formulation. Our research – Politics, Voice and Responsiveness in urban Pakistan – is looking at these questions.

Clientelism and citizen voice aggregation

Data from the Polity IV project shows that over the past thirty years there has been a dramatic spread of elected governments at the national and local levels. Evidence also suggests that national elections are fairly competitive in many emerging democracies. However, many democracies continue to struggle with weak party organizations at the local level. The existing evidence points to the prevalence of personalized machines of dynastic families and ethnic mobilizations, which weaken formal party structures.

How does citizen voice aggregation happen in this context? The standard answer in the literature is clientelism, particularly strong in communities where caste, ethnic and/or kinship networks underpin collective or group voting. Through clientelism, services are delivered as  quid pro quo arrangements between voters and electoral candidates. Voters make specific demands – for cash, or jobs, or a functional health center in the neighborhood – and politicians deliver these as best as they can, but only specifically in exchange for a vote. This provides strong incentives for targeted delivery of public services on a partisan basis rather than programmatic policy formulation that is likely to benefit both party and opposition voters.

Clientelist voter-politician interactions depend on reciprocity – both sides must deliver on their promise for the exchange to be complete – and on the ability of voters to aggregate their preferences. The clientelism literature suggests that it works effectively when voter-politician interactions are embedded in social networks, which are conducive to both reciprocity and aggregation. These networks provide information on whether voters who benefitted from politician delivery actually held to their side of the bargain and cast their vote for the politician in question. They also discipline the politician if the good that is contracted fails to be delivered after the elections.

What does citizen voice aggregation in Lahore look like?

However, little is known about the form actually taken by citizen voice aggregation in the megacities of emerging democracies, or how effectively it works there.

Our research explores these issues in non-elite neighborhoods in the Pakistani mega-city of Lahore, home to around 10 million people. The country made the transition from military rule to democracy in 2008, and Lahore’s politics is dominated by the ruling party, the PML-N. But a new political party – the PTI – has gained ground, and provided competition for the PML-N in 2013.

Many of our findings challenge the typical description of clientelism as citizen voice aggregation. Of those in our representative sample of 2000 adult respondents who voted in the last general election, the majority didn’t vote on the basis of ethnic, kinship or caste-based collective action. Instead, 54 percent of them report taking the voting decision independently or in consultation with their immediate family. Only 14 percent consulted with the forms of networks typically associated with clientelist exchange. In short, the group voting that is hypothesized to underpin clientelist exchange doesn’t appear to be prevalent in Lahore.

So how does the process of citizen voice aggregation work in this context? At the heart of the process are machines of political party constituency leaders that work through large networks of party workers. The evidence from our research suggests that the intensity of political party-citizen contact is much higher at the time of elections than after it. Thirty percent of our respondents reported having been in contact with a party worker at the time of elections, but only 10 percent afterwards. And an even smaller proportion reports having been in contact to express their needs for the purposes of planning public investment.

This presents a picture where party machines do exist at the local level, but do not serve as effective citizen voice aggregators. They function instead simply as the mechanism through which votes are aggregated at the time of elections. The connection between local party workers and citizens is weak after the election when programs and public investment are typically planned and executed.

Local party workers – key to understanding responsiveness?

To understand whether policy formulation and the planning of public investment is responsive to all voices, it is important to understand what determines the motivation and incentives of local party workers.

It is also important to understand which voters they are responsive to, what considerations apart from voter preferences drive their behavior, and how effective they are in influencing the choice of constituency leaders.

We are currently analyzing our data on these questions from our sample, who are located in four out of twenty-five provincial legislative seats of Lahore. We will be sharing all our research results very soon.

Ali Cheema is a research fellow at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS).

Asad Liaqat is a PhD candidate at Harvard University.

Shandana Khan Mohmand is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies.

This article was originally published on March 28th for Making All Voices Count.