Poverty – Page 2

June 29, 2017

How understanding women’s saving needs can improve micro-lending

By Rachel Cassidy, Fatima Habib, Shehryar Nabi, and Simon Quinn

There is growing evidence that increasing women’s income not only empowers them as individuals, but also improves the welfare of their families. This is because women tend to spend more than men on education and the physical well-being of children. Investments in children have important implications for social development outcomes such as stunting and education, both of which Pakistan performs poorly on compared to other countries in the region.

Many development interventions are hence increasingly focused on improving women’s access to finance. Pakistani organizations such as Kashf Foundation and the National Rural Support Program have given microloans to women for expanding their businesses and providing education and nutrition to their children.

Key to designing effective micro-lending schemes is understanding how women save money. Studies suggest that both men and women are tempted to spend money instantly even if they desire to save for the future. This is also known as having a “present-bias” or “self-control” problem. If present-biased business owners direct more money to consumption rather than saving and investment, they do not accumulate the capital necessary for their businesses to flourish.

“Commitment savings” products attempt to solve this problem by committing users to saving small amounts of money overtime to build long-term capital. Such products can be implemented in different ways. For example, regular deposits can be made into a savings account, or money can be withdrawn from the account only after a specified date. Uptake of commitment savings products has been high among women. However, research shows the impact of commitment savings is mixed: Some recipients experience large benefits, but usage and re-adoption rates are low, and some recipients even lose money.

Why would commitment savings – a product now popular with banks and NGOs – be inappropriate for some individuals? A study supported by the International Growth Centre (IGC) suggests that the “self-control” problem commitment savings products try to correct for may have been overstated among low-income women.

Researchers (Rachel Cassidy and Simon Quinn) tested this idea by interviewing 530 female microfinance borrowers in Punjab’s Sargodha district twice, with each interview spaced two weeks apart. The women were asked to indicate their demand for commitment savings products, report how much income they expected to earn and how much they actually earned, and perform activities designed to measure self-control. A participation fee was paid randomly to see how an influx of cash affected women’s savings overtime and performance on self-control tests. Half of the women were also interviewed before the wheat harvest, and the other half after the harvest, to understand how women’s responses were affected by the profits made during the harvest.

If self-control problems were a major factor in driving low savings, it was expected that women would show evidence of these problems whether or not they received a payment, and whether they were interviewed before or after the harvest. But the researchers found the opposite was true. Women appeared to have fewer problems with self-control if they were paid at the first interview, or interviewed after the harvest. This suggests that what might look like self-control problems may actually be women’s rational responses to changes in their cash flow over time.

Self-control also had no correlation with women’s demand for commitment savings products. However, demand was much higher after the wheat harvest, indicating that greater financial security may increase uptake of commitment savings. Women also preferred plans with fixed start and end dates over choosing their own timeline. Again, this suggests that women’s saving choices may be more rational than previously thought: When there is less money available, they prefer to keep it to themselves rather than risk committing scarce funds to a savings plan.

The study has important implications for how microfinance can be harnessed to improve social outcomes.

First, it would be unwise to design commitment savings products purely around self-control. Other strategies such as reminders to save and dealing with external constraints – such as spouses or relatives demanding money meant for saving – should be explored further.

Second, varying preferences for how commitment savings products are structured highlights the importance of making them flexible to women’s needs. Time matters a great deal here, as the study shows preferences are sensitive to seasonal changes.

Finally, it would be fruitful to examine other potential drivers of savings problems, particularly for women. More experimentation with different types of savings products is also needed, for example harnessing new technologies to give women greater control over their resources and providing more opportunities to save even for saving products in which money is easily accessible. This increased autonomy may enable female business owners to better allocate their savings towards their businesses as well as their children’s health and education.

Rachel Cassidy is a PhD candidate in Economics at Oxford University.

Fatima Habib is a research associate at the Consortium for Development Policy Research

Shehryar Nabi is a communications associate at the Consortium for Development Policy Research.

Simon Quinn is an associate professor of Economics at Oxford University.

April 4, 2017April 26, 2023

How well represented are women in Pakistan’s rural volunteer organizations?

By Hamna Ahmed, Asha Gul, Saheem Khizar, Simon Quinn, and Kate Vyborny

Since the 1980s, Pakistan has followed a unique model of social mobilization that has contributed greatly towards rural development and poverty alleviation. This model of social mobilization and community participation involves setting up local community organizations at the neighborhood, village and union council (UC) levels. These organizations comprise local volunteer citizens and are run like small firms with elected management bodies. Rather than address a single issue, they strive for overall community development and undertake activities in several sectors including health, education, microcredit, agriculture, infrastructure, disaster management, and conflict resolution.

The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) is the apex institution managing this social mobilization process with support from local partner organizations (POs). A joint research team from the Lahore School of Economics, Oxford University, and Duke University is collaborating with PPAF to study these volunteer organizations and how they can be supported to better represent their communities and improve their activities. In the fall of 2014, the team conducted a baseline survey of 850 volunteer organizations formed at the UC level. These organizations are referred to as Local Support Organizations (LSOs) or Third Tier Organizations (TTOs). The survey gathered data through meetings with each organization’s executive body (EB) on their governance, activities, future plans and characteristics of the EB members.

Data on village characteristics and organization activity for every village were also collected from one local contact in every UC. In a randomly-selected subset of 150 UCs, a representative sample of households was interviewed to gather data on perceptions about these volunteer organizations and household-level assistance received from them. Based on this data, we found that women both benefit from and are actively involved in the governance and decision-making process of these organizations.

The main findings are as follows:

Women’s representation varies greatly. About 25 percent of the volunteer organizations have all-female EBs, while just under 20 percent of these organizations have all male EBs, with the rest having mixed-gender EBs. Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir have mixed-gender organizations with a significant women’s representation. Almost 90 percent have at least one woman on the EB, while half have at least 25 percent female EB representation (Figure 1). Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan – traditionally socially conservative provinces –have much less women’s representation, with more than 40 percent of organizations with no women on the EB. In Punjab and Sindh there are many volunteer organizations with only women on the EB, in part reflecting deliberate efforts by PPAF and POs in these provinces to organize women’s-only volunteer organizations in recent years.

Figure 1

Women are less active than men in governance. Women are less likely to attend EB meetings and speak less frequently when they do attend. In mixed-gender organizations, women are less represented in office than men, especially in leadership roles. At the lower management level (i.e. the general body), attendance is equally high for men and women. This likely reflects the lower commitment level required for participation in general body meetings, which occur much less frequently.

Women are more active in organizations where they form the majority. In organizations where women form the majority, the female EB members are much more likely to attend, and more likely to speak. More women in majority-female mixed volunteer organizations hold office. The greater participation of women in environments where they are more concentrated may simply reflect local culture: women in more progressive UCs are more likely to join the volunteer organization, and are also more vocal. It might also be the case that women EB members feel more confident expressing themselves and contesting office when there are more women in the group.

Women EB members come from similar or poorer households than their male counterparts. It is thought that for a woman to be represented, she must have some compensating advantage. This suggests women in volunteer organizations are mostly from wealthier households. But we do not find evidence for this. Women EB members are just as likely to live in mud-brick houses as male EB members, and in fact are more likely in Sindh and Balochistan.

Organizations with more women are less well known in the community. Based on the evidence from the household survey conducted in the UCs, organizations with the most women tend to be least well known in their communities – even among female respondents. This surprising finding might suggest that even women in leadership roles in rural Pakistan are less able than men to effectively promote their organizations’ work publicly.

Practical constraints limit regular participation, especially for women. Significant numbers of both men and women EB members report difficulty attending due to work and transport issues, but more women report difficulties overall. Transport issues are the leading cause of difficulty for women, and are reported much more frequently than domestic responsibilities or issues with obtaining permission for leaving the village (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Local volunteer organizations tend to be more inclusive of women (and girls) as beneficiaries than in their governance. For almost 90 percent of volunteer organizations, women comprise at least 25 percent of their direct beneficiaries. Around 45 percent have a majority of women as their beneficiaries (Figure 3). The regional patterns of beneficiaries match gender representation in governance: the activities of organizations based in KP and Balochistan tend to directly benefit men more, while activities in Punjab and Sindh are more directed towards women (Figure 4). Microcredit and livelihoods programs are most heavily targeted at women, which in part is because of rules imposed by PPAF itself. Agriculture, dispute resolution and sporting/cultural activities more often target men.

Figure 3

Figure 4

Local volunteer organizations with more women in governance do more work targeted at women. Local volunteer organizations with more women on their EBs have more women as direct beneficiaries (Figure 5). Part of this occurs through project choice. EBs with more women’s involvement are also more active in health, education, microcredit, livelihoods, and human and legal rights. Those with only men’s involvement are more involved in infrastructure, sporting, cultural, and entertainment activities.

Figure 5

Figure 6

These findings provide a useful, detailed snapshot of the level of women’s inclusion in volunteer community organizations formed at the UC level across the country. However, these findings do not imply causal relationships that are important for policy making. For example, we know that organizations with more women on the EB serve more women beneficiaries, but we do not know whether encouraging EBs to include more women would necessarily increase the number of women beneficiaries.

An ongoing research project will help address these and other questions useful for engaging PPAF with TTOs. Through a randomized control trial, organizations in treatment groups are asked to submit regular reports on either active participation of women in EBs and general bodies, or on the women beneficiaries of their activities. Some volunteer organizations will be offered the opportunity to be publicly recognized if they improve the most in terms of women’s inclusion and other performance measures. The findings from this research will hopefully help guide PPAF practices in the future, build on the existing foundation of TTO organization and achievements, and better serve some of the poorest communities in Pakistan.

Hamna Ahmed is a a faculty member at the Lahore School of Economics and PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Kent

Asha Gul is a PhD candidate in Economics at the University of New South Wales.

Saheem Khizar is a field experiment coordinator at the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund.

Simon Quinn is an associate professor of Economics at Oxford University.

Kate Vyobrny is a post-doctoral fellow at Duke University.

February 1, 2017April 26, 2023

What President Trump means for Pakistan

By Shehryar Nabi

What does the Trump administration mean for Pakistan? Here are the key issues to watch:

Relations with the United States

The American foreign policy establishment has held an increasingly critical view of Pakistan. Despite being a U.S. ally in fighting terrorism, Pakistan has been accused of distinguishing between “good and bad” terrorists and supporting militant groups that threaten U.S. interests. Former President Barack Obama even questioned why Pakistan should remain an ally. Pakistan currently relies on the U.S. for $850 million worth of economic and military aid, which has declined over the past few years.

At his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense James Mattis said he will incentivize Pakistan to eliminate terrorists within its borders. He also said he would encourage collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan to combat terrorism. Mattis has in the past stressed the importance of maintaining an alliance with Pakistan despite frustration with its anti-terror efforts.

National Security Advisor Michael Flynn has taken a tougher position. In his recent book, The Field of Fight, he wrote that Pakistan must choose between helping extremists or receiving harsh treatment from the United States. If this translates into less aid or more trade restrictions, sectors of Pakistan’s economy that depend on American money could suffer.

Pakistan’s tightening geopolitical relationship with China may put it in an awkward position if the U.S.-China relationship starts to deteriorate. Trump talked disparagingly about China’s effect on the American economy during the presidential campaign. Trump’s pick for secretary of state said that he would block China’s access to artificial islands it built in the South China Sea. China responded with aggressive statements. But hostilities could be checked by Trump’s pick for ambassador to China, whom the Chinese government has praised as “an old friend”.

Continued expansion of America’s relationship with India could also strain U.S.-Pakistan relations. In August, the U.S. and India signed an agreement that relaxed institutional impediments to military logistics-sharing between the two countries. In December, the U.S. also officially recognized India as a “Major Defense Partner”, guaranteeing future military collaboration. Secretary of Defense Mattis has said he would continue strengthening U.S.-India ties.

These actions are perceived as an attempt by the U.S. to check China’s influence in Asia. If China takes issue with a militarily empowered India, it might find an even stronger ally in Pakistan, which is likely to be alarmed by the situation. This would only add to the awkwardness of Pakistan’s position with the U.S.

Climate change

Rising sea levels and drought induced by climate change threaten to create tens of millions of climate refugees in Pakistan. But Pakistan alone can’t do much about it beyond trying to adapt, because the main contributors to global warming are the United States, Europe and China.

There are clear signs that Donald Trump’s presidency would diminish America’s vital role in upholding global commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. As part of the Paris Agreement, the Obama administration vowed to shut down coal-fired power plants, which would lower U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by up to 28 percent. The Trump administration intends to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement and lift Obama-era regulations that limit the extraction of fossil fuels. He tweeted in the past that climate change was “created by and for the Chinese”, and he picked a climate skeptic to head the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Without America’s cooperation in global pledges to reduce greenhouse gases, the world will move faster towards an atmospheric temperature of 2 degrees Celsius – widely considered the climate “danger zone”.

Remittances

Remittances – money sent by migrants to their countries of origin – make up seven percent of Pakistan’s GDP. 13 percent of those remittances ($1.3 billion) come from the United States. Remittances play a crucial role in making poorer families resilient during natural disasters and periods of economic uncertainty, and they can even spur entrepreneurship.

Pakistan could see a sharp increase in remittances from the United States in the near term if Pakistanis living there fear prejudice and send money back in case they have to return. This is precisely what happened after the September 11^th attacks in 2001 led to a rise in in anti-Muslim sentiment. From 2001 to 2002, remittances to Pakistan from the United States nearly tripled.

Why would Pakistanis fear prejudice? Trump’s campaign was marked by controversial statements about Muslims such as his proposed temporary ban on all Muslim travel to the United States, the notion that Islam hates America and the establishment of a Muslim registry. Hate crimes against Muslims also increased by 67 percent from 2014 to 2015, and there is concern that perpetrators of these crimes are empowered by Trump. However, recent polling data showing that overall American favorability of Muslims increased (mainly driven by members of the Democratic and Independent parties) during Trump’s campaign suggests growing prejudice and support for Muslims are parallel trends.

On Friday, Trump signed an executive order barring all immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries, and the White House hinted that Pakistan could be included in the future. However, there is room in the order for exempting immigrants on a case-by-case basis, and the order won’t apply to green card holders.

If these factors combine to foster anxiety among Pakistanis living in the U.S., remittances could rise in the near term. But if more Pakistanis leave the U.S. and fewer choose to migrate there, there will likely be a long-term slump in remittances.

Human capital

Thousands of Pakistanis go to the United States to study and work every year. Many of them stay in America and find employment in high-skilled jobs. This has contributed to a “brain drain”: Pakistan is missing out on the contribution of highly educated citizens who choose to work abroad.

But at the same time, many Pakistanis come back and make a real impact with the advanced knowledge acquired in other countries. This knowledge makes them great “human capital”.

If the Trump administration fosters the hostile environment described above, would Pakistan benefit from a “reverse brain drain” – when highly educated Pakistanis decide to come back? It might, but those Pakistanis may prefer to work in another country with organizations that reward advanced skills and talent. Pakistan lacks enough of those organizations.

If Trump’s presidency marks a longer-term decline in Pakistani access to American institutions, high-achieving Pakistanis who want to bring back global knowledge and experience will have a harder time doing so.

Exports

Exports are a key driver of economic growth in Pakistan. The United States is Pakistan’s top export destination with $3.7 billion worth of exports in 2015.

86 percent of those exports are from textiles, which dominate Pakistan’s manufacturing sector. Invigorating this currently struggling sector will lead to mass job creation that will reduce poverty and help prevent a future unemployment crisis.

Anger over the loss of manufacturing jobs in America was decisive for Trump’s election victory. He touted protectionist trade policies during his campaign to bring outsourced manufacturing jobs back to the United States.

He pledged to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) if it isn’t renegotiated in America’s favor, he killed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and vowed to impose a 45 percent tariff on goods from China. While it’s unclear whether Trump’s top officials on trade would advocate these exact policies, they hold a similar, skeptical outlook on America’s trade deals.

This protectionism, if applied to Pakistan, will make it more expensive for Americans to buy Pakistani goods and may reduce export earnings from the United States.

Multilateral engagement with Pakistan

Pakistan receives billions of dollars from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both of which receive more funding from the United States than any other country.

The Trump administration has drafted, but not yet implemented, two executive orders that could lower U.S. commitment to these and other international organizations.

The first order cuts funding for any United Nations agency or other international body that, among other criteria, grants membership to the Palestinian Authority or Palestine Liberation Organization, funds abortion or receives money from any state that sponsors terror or violates human rights. The order further mandates a minimum 40 percent decrease in spending toward international organizations.

The second order requires a review of America’s current multilateral treaties and withdraws from those that are not directly related to national security, extradition or international trade.

The fact that the order has been delayed could mean it will be amended. But it signals that the Trump administration is serious about rolling back U.S. global engagements in the development sector. Resources for organizations that support healthcare, education, infrastructure development, energy and other sectors will likely be reduced. Indeed, the effectiveness of international donor money for development is subject to debate. But if the orders result in decreased global support for Pakistan’s development goals, achieving them will be a greater challenge.

Shehryar Nabi works in communications for the Consortium for Development Policy Research and the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives.

January 10, 2017April 26, 2023

The six biggest challenges facing Pakistan’s urban future

Hina Shaikh and Ijaz Nabi

Pakistan is among the most urbanized countries of South Asia. As challenges mount, urban planning is gradually finding space in the policy discourse. This is the first of three blog posts on Pakistan’s rapid urbanization. It discusses the pace of urbanization and the major problems associated with it. This will be followed by posts on how the government is responding to the challenges and how and whether the research community is engaged in seeking solutions.
Continue reading “The six biggest challenges facing Pakistan’s urban future”

December 29, 2016April 26, 2023

15 changes in 2016 that shaped Pakistan’s development path

(Image: Flickr user junaidrao, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Shehryar Nabi

Whether you are a pessimist or an optimist about the future, 2016 was indisputably a pivotal year for the world. Here’s a recap of the changes both in and out of Pakistan in 2016 that will affect its development path:

1. Poverty was re-defined

The poverty rate increased significantly this year after the government updated its own methodology for determining poverty, and found that 30 percent of Pakistanis are poor.

The United Nations Development Programme also released Pakistan’s first-ever multidimensional poverty index, which uses non-wealth indicators such as education and health to measure poverty. Using this method, Pakistan’s poverty rate comes to 39 percent.

The good news is that no matter the measure, the poverty rate has been declining overtime, albeit unevenly across different regions.

As argued here, efforts to re-define poverty indicate a willingness to adapt the measure for better anti-poverty interventions. This means that more poor people living above the official poverty line can be targeted by poverty reduction efforts.

2. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor became functional

The first Chinese ship docked at Gwadar port to receive goods transported along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for sale in global markets, opening CPEC to international trade. The government estimates that the $54 billion Chinese investment in infrastructure and energy will create 800,000 jobs and boost Pakistan’s GDP growth rate from its current 4.7 percent to 7 percent in 2018.

But CPEC enthusiasts shouldn’t express their jubilation at the initial investment alone. The transformative effects of CPEC will only be felt if regions adopt policies to accommodate it, and local entrepreneurs seize the opportunity.

CPEC is also tightening Pakistan and China’s military relationship, raising eyebrows in India.

3. More protections for women were legislated

Two bills giving women greater legal protection from physical and sexual violence were passed in 2016.

In February, the Punjab assembly passed the Protection of Women Against Violence Act, which expands the kinds of actions women can report as violence and establishes a process for reporting abuse, protecting victims and bringing cases to court.

In October, parliament passed anti-honor killing and anti-rape bills. The new laws prevent the victim’s family from forgiving the perpetrator of an “honor killing” (unless the perpetrator is sentenced to a capital punishment) and, for rape cases, set a three-month time limit for determining verdicts, require DNA testing as evidence and impose a minimum prison sentence of 25 years for the offender.

The Protection of Women Against Violence Act was criticized by the Council of Islamic Ideology as being un-Islamic and unconstitutional.

Activists praised the bills as a step in the right direction, but there is concern that the laws do not go far enough and lack proper implementation.

4. The International Monetary Fund ended its stabilization program

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ended its US $6.7 billion, three year stabilization program that increased Pakistan’s foreign reserves enough for four months of imports, reduced its deficit from 8 to 4.3 percent and maintained a steady outlook for economic growth.

While Pakistan is safe from an external shock to its economy for now, the IMF may come back if necessary reforms to make Pakistan resilient to global economic shifts are delayed for too long.

5. Relations soured with Afghanistan . . .

Continued criticism from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani that Pakistan has not done enough to prevent cross-border terrorism, skirmishes at the Khyber Pass and plans to deport 3 million Afghan refugees could further slowdown Pakistan and Afghanistan’s trade relationship and hurt regional cooperation.

6. . . . and India

The glimmer of hope for India-Pakistan relations established after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore quickly faded when terrorists allegedly based in and supported by Pakistan killed seven Indian soldiers and one civilian at Pathankot air force base, 19 soldiers at Uri and seven soldiers at Nagrota in India-administered Kashmir.

Anti-India sentiment was also inflamed in Pakistan after the Indian army cracked down on Kashmiri protesters, killing 89 and causing eye damage to thousands, many of whom became permanently blind.

Bollywood banned Pakistani actors, and Pakistan banned Bollywood films (until recently). India carried out “surgical strikes” against terrorists in Pakistan – although official and civilian narratives of the strikes differ. There were more cross-border firings between Pakistani and Indian soldiers. The Indus Waters Treaty came under threat.

While improved India-Pakistan relations are desirable for expanding trade, cultural exchanges and preventing war, the events of 2016 do not bode well.

7. Pakistan became Asia’s best-performing stock market

The Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad stock exchanges merged into the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), which became Asia’s best-performing stock market with an increased value of 27 percent.

Recently, a Chinese-led consortium acquired a 40 percent stake in the PSX, with the hopes of drawing more Chinese investment into Pakistan’s economy.

8. The Panama Papers changed politics

The anti-corruption agenda spearheaded by the leading opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), was bolstered by the Panama Papers investigation that revealed Nawaz Sharif’s children as among the global rich and powerful who hold large offshore accounts.

While there is currently no evidence that the money was extracted through corrupt means, the issue has become a thorn in the side of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) for the 2018 election. With a PMLN victory, voters can expect a continuation of the energy-expanding, infrastructure-building focus of development policy. But if the Panama issue remains potent, securing a PTI win, Pakistan may change course.

9. Pakistan became committed to global CO2 reduction targets

In November, Pakistan ratified the Paris Agreement, which commits countries to reduced CO2 emissions targets. Pakistan also passed the Climate Change Bill 2016, which proposes measures for mitigating the effects of climate change. However, having different ministries implement the measures will be a separate, though important challenge given the threats climate change poses to flood risk, food security and the overall economy.

10. Power generation costs continued to fall

Lower global oil prices and the expansion of wind, hydel, coal, solar and nuclear power projects have made power generation much cheaper, as seen by a recent 50 percent cost reduction in November. Energy costs will likely fall even further if more power companies are privatized, and CPEC energy investments are made next year. The government is hoping that by the 2018 election, regular blackouts will end. However, if power losses from transmission and distribution and inefficient energy usage are not addressed, blackouts will likely return.

11. Infrastructure, infrastructure, infrastructure

New highways. Upgraded railroads. Metro lines. Pakistan’s push for modern infrastructure intensified in 2016.

There is a view that the government is giving infrastructure too much focus and, as a consequence, neglecting the education and health sectors. Others argue that better infrastructure is a form of economic justice.

12. Polio moved closer to eradication

In 2014, there were 306 new cases of polio in Pakistan, a significant increase from preceding years. In response, the government began carrying out regular vaccination drives. This year, only 22 new cases of polio were reported.

The final push to complete eradication still poses challenges, as health workers administering vaccines are threatened by attacks and outdated systems for managing anti-polio drives could leave some children unvaccinated.

13. A cure for Hepatitis C became more affordable

According to Pakistan’s health ministry, about 8 million Pakistanis have Hepatitis C, and 80,000 die from the disease every year. The most effective treatment for the disease is the drug sofosbuvir, but unless a local pharmaceutical company has the rights to produce a generic version, it costs US $1,000 per pill.

This year, the Pakistani pharmaceutical Ferozsons acquired those rights and began manufacturing the drug to be sold at a slashed price of $56 for 28 doses. While poor sanitation and dirty needle use will likely keep Hepatitis C prevalence high, the availability of a low-cost treatment will undoubtedly save lives.

14. A program to reduce malnourishment began

With the support of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Pakistan launched a food fortification program to fight malnourishment. 44 percent of Pakistani children under five have stunted growth from malnutrition, slowing their cognitive ability and increasing their susceptibility to disease. The program will add micronutrients to flour and edible oils with the hopes that in five years, they will be consumed by over half of the population.

15. The West saw a historic political shift

Pakistan will likely feel the effects of the major political and economic changes in the West: the election of Donald Trump to the United States presidency, Britain’s exit from the European Union and the rise of political parties that favor less trade, less foreign aid and less immigration.

Pakistan may be caught in an awkward position vis-à-vis relations with China and the US if they engage in a trade war, foreign aid could decline and discouraged Pakistani migrants in the West might cause a drop in remittances.

These possibilities and more will be examined in greater detail for a future post.

Shehryar Nabi works in communications for the Consortium for Development Policy Research (CDPR) and the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS)